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Recent Decision:
Redeeming Social Importance
Held Decisive in Determining
Question of Obscenity
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction of a theater operator for pos-
sessing and exhibiting an obscene film,
"The Lovers," in violation of a state ob-
scenity statute. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the conviction and held
that in this area it could not "avoid mak-
ing an independent constitutional judg-
ment on the facts of the case" utilizing a
national community standard, and that an
allegedly obscene work could not be pro-
scribed unless it is "utterly" without social
import. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
(1964).
In holding Tropic of Cancer entitled to
constitutional protection in the case of
Grove Press, Inc. v. Gersteint and by pos-
ing a "national standard" for obscenity in
Jacobellis,2 the Supreme Court has, in ef-
fect, limited the definition of obscenity to
hard core pornography. Tropic of Cancer
has been described by some as being in
the precise fringe area short of hard core
pornography.5 Thus, the attendant difficul-
ties in determining a national consensus
with regard to whether Tropic of Cancer
is obscene are apparent.4
More important than the clarification
of definitive standards in any area, how-
ever, is the provision for their application.
1 378 U.S. 577 (1964) (per curiam).
2Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
3 See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Ob-
scenity: The Developing Constitutional Stand-
ards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 60 (1960).
4 Id. at 112; Regan, Freedom of the Mind and
Justice Brennan, 9 CATHOLIC LAW. 269, 278-79
(1963).
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With this in mind, the Court in Jacobellis,
by providing for an independent constitu-
tional judgment on the facts of each case,
has established a procedural basis for en-
forcing its views on obscenity. State courts,
wary of reversal and apprised of the fact
that their factual determinations might not
remain inviolate, will probably adhere to
the prescribed standards.
The confusion which spawned the Jaco-
bellis decision resulted from comments
made by the Supreme Court in the land-
mark case of Roth v. United States.
There, Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, stated that in determining "whether
to the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole ap-
peals to prurient interest," 6 cognizance
must be given the fact that the rejection
of obscenity as "utterly without redeeming
social importance" was implicit in the his-
tory of the first amendment. 7
The controversy which followed the
Roth decision was based primarily on Mr.
Justice Brennan's concentration on the
"prurient interest" test. The emphasis
which was to be accorded social impor-
tance thus assumed a central role in the
discussion of obscenity standards. In the
New York Court of Appeals the test of
"redeeming social importance" was held
to be irrelevant and Tropic of Cancer was
consequently found obscene based on the
strict "prurient interest" testA The highest
5 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
rld. at 489. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 484. (Emphasis added.)
8 People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 125, 192
N.E.2d 713, 716-17, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6-7 (1963).
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court of California in Zietlin v. Arnebergh9
rejected a test which would have balanced
social importance against "prurient inter-
est," and consequently ruled that Tropic
of Cancer was constitutionally protected.
In prescribing a standard, the California
court stated that the word "utterly," as em-
ployed in the phrase "utterly without re-
deeming social importance," connoted any
work totally devoid of social import. Thus,
the opinion concluded that the mere pres-
ence of matters of social import in ques-
tioned material would recover for it a con-
stitutionally protected position. This inter-
pretation of the Roth standard, apparently
applicable to the companion case of Grove
Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, was cited with ap-
proval by Mr. Justice Brennan in the in-
stant case. 10
The established obscenity test would
thus seem to necessarily assume a dual
complexion: first, it must be determined by
the court whether the questioned material
appeals to the "prurient interest" of the
average man; second, the Supreme Court
will evaluate the material to determine if it
has any social value. If it possesses this
quality, then its protected position will
be recovered. It is interesting to note that
this two-fold examination leads to the ano-
malous situation in which a book may be
found appealing to the "prurient interest"
of the average man, and yet may not be
banned, because an intellectual, critic,
writer, or literary "buff" - someone far
above the average-finds literary merit in
9 59 Cal. 2d 901, 912, 383 P.2d 152, 164-65, 31
Cal. Rep. 800, 812-13 (1963). But see, McCauley
v. "Tropic of Cancer," 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.
2d 545 (1963). Compare Attorney Gen'l v. Book
Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11, 184
N.E.2d 328 (1962).
10 Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 2, at 191.
the work. Stated conversely, save for the
social value test, the intellectual would be
reduced to reading only what is fit for the
average person."
If the above test is employed, a combi-
nation of factors will unite to limit the ob-
scene to that which is hard core pornog-
raphy. Utilizing such a test, social value
can be characterized as an emergency lever,
inoperative until a particular work is first
judged as appealing to "prurient interest."
The latter test then can be classified as
the primary and preliminary standard.
In its capacity as the first hurdle on the
road to suppression, "prurient interest" has
not been left at rest in its embryonic state.
In Manual Enterprises v. Day, 2 a case in-
volving the publication of a magazine for
the benefit and use of homosexuals, Mr.
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court and
declaring the magazine constitutionally
protected, stated that the "current com-
munity standards" aspect of the Roth rule
would necessitate a national standard for
violations of federal law. 3 However, this
rule is not controlling on the facts of the
Jacobellis decision, since in Jacobellis the
Court was dealing with a violation of state
law.
11 See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 3, at
113-14.
12 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Prior to Manual Enter-
prises, the Supreme Court rendered several per
curiam decisions citing only the Roth case in
reversing the court of appeals, which upheld
the obscenity of the material involved: a nudist
magazine, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield,
355 U.S. 372 (1958); a magazine for homo-
sexuals, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371
(1958); and a film dealing with the seduction
of a sixteen-year-old boy by an older woman
and other "illicit sexual intimacies and acts,"
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35
(1957).
13 Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488
(1962).
Nothwithstanding this distinction, the in-
stant case applied a national standard to a
state court decision involving the violation
of a state statute. The rationale for this
now solidified approach regarding a na-
tional standard covers the gamut of tradi-
tional reasoning. Mr. Justice Brennan
posed the query that since the Constitution
is national, should not its standards be na-
tionwide? 14 He also traced the history of
the use of "community" in this context and
concluded that the word, as first employed
by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Kennerley,1 5 was intended to indicate "so-
ciety at large.' 16 In addition, Mr. Justice
Brennan posed the inevitable hypothetical
which would follow as a result of establish-
ing local community standards as opposed
to a national standard. He reasoned that
the result of sustaining "the suppression of
a particular book or film in one locality
would deter its dissemination in other lo-
calities where it might be held not obscene
.... ,,1 This, the opinion concluded, would
necessarily follow, since purveyors would
defer from risking criminal conviction by
testing the differences in standards among
various locales.
Obviously, the establishment by the Su-
preme Court of a national standard and a
clarification of the import of social value
would be ineffective, if lower courts could
continue to circumvent this standard by
declaring that the issue of obscenity is a
factual question within the exclusive do-
main of a jury. To dispel any such notions
and to insure adherence to the standard,
the Court, as indicated above, provided for
14 Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 2, at 195.
1" 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
16 Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 2, at 193.
17 id. at 194.
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an independent constitutional judgment on
the facts of each case. In support of this
proposition, Mr. Justice Brennan cited
Pennekamp v. Florida,8 a case in which a
disputed question of fact was examined by
the Court and possibly relied on as being
decisive in its determination. 19 Thus, it
would appear that the Court intends not
only to give lip service to its theory of re-
view, but also to employ it to the fullest
extent.
In his dissent in Jacobellis, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren objected to this theory on
the basis that the Court would thus be act-
ing as the "Super Censor of all the obscen-
ity purveyed throughout the Nation. '20 The
alternative solution suggested by the Chief
Justice took the form of an empirically spe-
cific " 'sufficient evidence' standard of re-
view-requiring something more than
merely any evidence but something less
than substantial evidence .... ,, 21
Jacobellis is significant because it clari-
fies the conflict and ambiguity generated by
18 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
19 Note, Supreme Court Review of State Find-
ings of Fact in Fourteenth Amendment Cases, 14
STAN. L. REV. 328, 352 (1962). In the specific
area of obscenity the Court has never before
faced the review issue squarely, since there has
not been a case in which the statute was con-
strued as valid on its face with the defendant
contesting the finding of obscenity. Id. at 355.
Compare the above statement with Regan, supra
note 4, at 278 and cases there cited. For state-
ments of the extent of review undertaken by the
Court in related areas see, e.g., Pierre v. Louisi-
ana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 (1939); Traux v. Corri-
gan, 257 U.S. 312, 325 (1921).
20 Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 2, at 203 (dis-
senting opinion).
21 Ibid. For opinions of Mr. Chief Justice
Warren espousing the theory of independent re-
view in related first amendment areas, see Black-
burn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Fikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
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Roth. While it does not resolve the problem courts in determining whether a material
of what is obscene, viz., hard core pornog- is obscene being firmly formulated, the
raphy, it does establish the test to be used courts can now concentrate on determining
in making such a determination. Thus, with that issue without first having to interpret
the criteria to be employed by the various the somewhat ambiguous Roth decision.
Recent Decision:
Narcotics Statute Ruled
Inapplicable to Religious
Use of Peyote
Three Navajo Indians were arrested
while practicing an ancient religious rite
involving the use of hallucination-produc-
ing peyote.' Upon appeal of their convic-
tion for the illegal possession of narcotics,
the defendants argued that the statutory
prohibition against the possession and use
of peyote contained in Section 11500 of
the California Health and Safety Code
abridged their constitutionally guaranteed
right to the free exercise of religion. The
state contended that Peyotism shackles the
Indians to primitive conditions and under-
mines enforcement of narcotics laws. Re-
versing the judgment of the superior court,
the California Supreme Court held that the
state's compelling interest in law enforce-
'Peyote is a product of the plant lophophora
williamsii, growing in small buttons on the spine-
less cactus indigenous to Texas and northern
Mexico. Mescaline, its principal constituent, re-
leases its effects when the buttons are chewed
or a derivative tea is consumed by the user. The
types of hallucinations produced vary from
bright-hued kaleidoscopic patterns to the symp-
tomatic visions of schizophrenia. The visual
effects are usually coupled with a heightened
sense of comprehension and friendliness toward
others. Technically peyote is not a narcotic, but
a non-addicting hallucinogen whose users suffer
no after effects when the hallucinatory stage has
passed. For further discussion, see N.Y. Times,
Nov. 1, 1964, § 6 (Magazine), p. 96.
ment was insufficient to outweigh the con-
stitutional guarantees of religious freedom
invoked by appellants as to their bona
fide use of peyote as a sacramental symbol.
People v. Woody, - Cal.-, 394 P.2d
813, 40 Cal. Rep. 69 (1964).
There is little consistency among the
cases interpreting the alleged infringement
of first amendment religious liberty by
state and federal statutes. A review of these
cases reveals not only disparity in the forms
of the religious practices involved but also
diversity in the approaches taken by the
courts in reaching these decisions.2
One of the leading cases in this field is
Sherbert v. Verner,3 in which the United
States Supreme Court held that a Seventh
Day Adventist was unconstitutionally de-
prived of the right to the free exercise of
2 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961),
in which the Court denied relief to Orthodox
Jewish merchants who sought relief from Penn-
sylvania's Sunday Closing Laws, holding that the
statute did not deprive appellants of their re-
ligion, but only made their religious observance
more expensive. Compare Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), in which the
Court granted relief to Jehovah's Witness school-
children whose religious refusal to pledge allegi-
ance to the flag violated a state regulation, with
State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash.
2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952), in which the court
denied religious exemption to a Christian Scien-
tist student who protested an X-ray examination
prerequisite to registration at the University of
Washington.
3 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
